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Abstract
We examine the pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist in
a two-sided market where the type structure of buyers on one side of
the market is an important determinant of profit on the other side.
In this situation it might be optimal to set prices below the maxi-
mum sellout price and to ration demand by a random mechanism in
the first market to reach a type distribution more favorable for sales
in the other market. The model establishes demand quality as an
alternative link between markets in addition to standard quantita-
tive effects and explains frequently observed underpricing, e.g. in the
(sports) entertainment industry. It also provides an explanation for
the effort a monopolist incurs to deter from resale.
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1 Introduction
The FIFA soccer world championships are one of the most important events
in sports – and the entertainment industry. The sale of tickets for its 2006
edition in Germany has been a great deal of public discussion. During the
first selling-period in February and March 2005, ticket prices ranged from
35 Euro for a group match in the forth seating category to 600 Euro for
the final in the first category. Though some reader may think that was not
cheap, demand exceeded supply already three days after ticket orders were
possible. At the end of the selling-period excess demand amounted to more
than factor 10. The FIFA rationed the demand by a random allocation of
tickets. Moreover, the tickets were personalized in order to prevent resale
in the black market. Resale of tickets was allowed only at the purchase
price via an official platform installed and controlled by the FIFA. Given the
huge excess demand it is, prima facie, surprising that ticket prices were not
set higher ex ante or determined by an auction-like mechanism. Why were
the tickets so cheap? And why did the FIFA incur so much effort to deter
customers from resale?
The model developed in this paper simultaneously solves both the un-
derpricing puzzle and the one of resale deterrence without giving up the
assumption of profit maximizing behavior. We examine the pricing decision
of a multi-product monopolist in a two-sided market where the type structure
of buyers on one side of the market is an important determinant of profit on
the other side. In this situation it might be optimal to lower prices below the
maximum sellout price and to ration demand by a random mechanism in the
first market to reach a type distribution more favorable for sales in the other
market. Moreover, in order to maintain the intended type structure in the
first market, the monopolist might spend effort taking action against resale.
Multi-product monopoly pricing and two-sided markets
A fundamental result of the literature on optimal pricing of a multi-product
monopolist is that optimal price structures reflect interdependent demands
(Tirole, 1988). To maximize profits a multi-product monopolist sets prices
such that the sum of marginal revenues across all markets is equal to the
marginal costs for each good. If the goods are substitutes the monopolist will
optimally charge a higher price than if the goods are produced by separate
monopolists, and vice versa for goods that are complements.
Similarly, the literature on two-sided markets investigates optimal pricing
if demand externalities are present (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). The seller acts
as an intermediary who brings two groups together by doing business with
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both of them. To maximize his own profit the seller charges a lower price
on one side of the market if a negative externality from the other side exists,
and a higher price if the externality is positive.
In both cases, the link between the product markets is brought about
by quantity effects. Therefore price structures that do not imply a change
in the transaction volume in the market, from which a one-sided link to
another market originates, are equivalent. In particular, prices below the
maximum price for which the product is sold at the production capacity
in the first market, call it maximum sellout price, seem to be inefficient
and unreasonable. However, like in the FIFA World Cup example above,
such prices are frequently observed, especially in the entertainment industry.
Tickets for sports and music events are often sold out early before the event
and would probably be sold out even at significantly higher prices.
We argue that this phenomenon does not originate from a quantitative
but a qualitative externality that is still present if the monopolist sells at
capacity: The demand quality, i.e. the type structure of buyers with respect
to an unobserved individual characteristic, in one market (market 1) may be
an important determinant of profit in another otherwise unrelated market
(market 2). Put differently, the (expected) distribution of the unobserved
individual characteristic among customers in market 1 exerts a (positive)
externality on the demand of customers in market 2. Of course, a rational
monopolist takes this effect into account. Given that demand quality reacts
to consumer prices in market 1, he can use the price structure as a screening
device: If no superior discrimination procedures can be used, he might find
it optimal to set a price below the maximum sellout price and ration demand
by a random mechanism in order to reach a type distribution among cus-
tomers in market 1 more favorable for sales in market 2. Moreover, he might
incur effort to credibly deter customers from resale in order to maintain the
intended type structure in market 1.
Coming back to the introductory example, in light of this general ar-
gument the selling strategy for the FIFA World Cup tickets can be easily
rationalized. Successful marketing of sports events – especially sports events
that are widely broadcasted in the media – viably depends on the atmosphere
in the stadium which is influenced by the types of individuals among the audi-
ence, e.g. their willingness to cheer. If this willingness to cheer is negatively
related to income and tickets are a normal commodity, higher admission
charges lower the (expected) willingness to cheer among spectators. Put dif-
ferently, setting high ticket prices drives out high-quality fans, beclouds the
atmosphere, and hence leads to a loss of revenue in markets that suffer from
low emotions, e.g. the one for sponsorship contracts or merchandizing prod-
ucts. Moreover, the type structure among spectators intended by low ticket
3
prices can only be maintained if the resale of tickets in the black market is
credibly prevented.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it establishes de-
mand quality as an alternative link between markets in addition to standard
quantitative effects in the literature on monopolistic price setting in two-sided
markets. Second, it adds a new explanation to the literature dealing with
the phenomenon of underpricing, particularly in the (sports) entertainment
industry.
The similarity between our model and the existing literature on two-sided
markets – an overview is provided by Rochet and Tirole (2004) – arises from
the fact that the customer base in market 1 determines sales in market 2.
However, only the quality of the customer base matters in our case. A related
idea can be found in the literature on efficient matching (Damiano and Li,
2004).
There are alternative explanations for the underpricing phenomenon that
may occur independently of the one proposed in our paper.
Several studies emphasize the role of fairness (Kahnemann et al., 1992),
loyalty (Salant, 1986) or distributional aspects but lead away from the stan-
dard assumption of a profit maximizing organizer. However, it has been
shown that, for example, ticket prices in the American baseball league are
determined by a monopolistic profit maximizing strategy (Alexander, 2001).
Swafford (1999) shows that low prices might be optimal in a situation
with demand uncertainty. Although uncertainty might always play a role
in real world markets, it is beyond doubt that many entertainment events
where underpricing is observed are expected to sell out at these prices.
The reason, first suggested by Becker (1991), that allowing additional
fans to enter at lower prices increases everyone’s willingness to pay for par-
ticipating in the event, leads into the same direction as our paper. However,
in case of a sellout, no additional spectators are possible. We argue instead
that the seller aims at the right ones.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The formal modal is
set up in Section 2 and used to derive the main results in Section 3. Section
4 illustrates the mechanism and the results by means of a simple example.
Finally, possible extensions and scope for further research are discussed in
section 5.
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2 The model
We consider a partial equilibrium model of a two-product monopoly. The
monopolist sells one commodity, called tickets t, to individuals in the t-
market and another commodity, called sponsorship contracts x, to firms in
the x-market.
Individuals’ demand and demand quality
Assume that there is a set of individuals I; for analytical convenience sup-
pose I := [0, 1].1 Individuals i ∈ I differ with respect to their exogenous
endowment with income yi, which is distributed on [y, y¯] ⊂ R+0 with the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) F and density f , and another unob-
servable characteristic ei, which is distributed on [e, e¯] ⊂ R+ with the cdf G
and density g. For the sake of concreteness, we refer to this characteristic ei
as individual willingness to show emotions or, for short, emotionality. Note,
however, that this is just one of arbitrarily many real world interpretations.
Each individual i ∈ I exhibits preferences over the consumption of two
goods, tickets t and other commodities q, according to the strictly quasi
concave utility function
u : R2 → R,
(ti, qi) 7→ u(ti, qi).
The price for tickets is referred to as pt, the price for other commodities is
normalized to 1. Each consumer takes the prices of the goods as given and
maximizes utility by choosing its preferred bundle of goods in his respective
budget set. In particular we assume that either one ticket is demanded if the
individual’s valuation is high enough or none at all:
ti(pt) =
{
0, if vi < pt,
1, if pt 6 v
i.
(1)
Thereby, vi ∈ [v, v¯] ⊂ R+0 denotes individual i’s willingness to pay for the
ticket and is defined by2
u(1, yi − vi) = u(0, yi). (2)
We will assume in the following that the willingness to pay rises with income
(but is independent from emotionality).
1A case of finitely many individuals is discussed in the example below.
2Note that vi cannot be defined like this for arbitrary utility functions; in particular,
we exclude utility functions with the property lim
t→0
∂
∂t
u(t, q) = +∞, for q > 0.
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Assumption 1 For all i ∈ I, assume dv
i
dyi
> 0.
Equation (2) implicitly defines an invertible function
y : [v, v¯]→ [y, y¯], vi 7→ y(vi) = yi;
applying the implicit function theorem yields
dvi
dyi
=
∂
∂q
u(1, yi − vi)− ∂
∂q
u(0, yi)
∂
∂q
u(1, yi − vi)
. (3)
Hence, Assumption 1 is equivalent to suppose that ∂
∂q
u(1, yi−vi) > ∂
∂q
u(0, yi).
This condition is satisfied in particular for separable utility functions u(t, q) =
uˆ(t) + u˜(q), where u˜ is strictly concave.
As an immediate consequence of Assumption 1, total demand for tickets
t(pt) =
y¯∫
y(pt)
1 · f(y)dy = 1− F (y(pt))
decreases as the price pt increases, since
dt(pt)
dpt
= −f(y(pt))
dy(pt)
dpt
.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1,
dt(pt)
dpt
< 0.
In the remainder of this subsection we characterize what we will call
demand quality, namely the type structure of individuals who demand tickets
given a price pt with respect to their willingness to show emotions. To this
end we make an assumption which is somewhat more specific and debatable.
We assume the average emotionality e˜(y) := Eg(e
i | yi ≥ y) of individuals
with a minimum income of y to decrease as y increases.
Assumption 2 For all y ∈ [y, y¯], assume de˜(y)
dy
< 0.
This may just be seen as an empirically testable sociological hypothesis, for
which there is a lot of anecdotal evidence. It is, however, beyond the scope
of our analysis to answer this empirical question. Our main concern is to
establish demand quality as a possible channel at which monopolistic price
setting behavior is influenced.3
Given Assumption 2, the average emotionality e˜(y(pt)) of customers de-
manding tickets in the t-market obviously decreases as the ticket price pt
increases, since de˜(y(pt))
dpt
= de˜(y)
dy
dy(pt)
dpt
.
3Alternatively, the more suspicious reader may interpret the characteristic ei as indi-
vidual i’s age and more comfortably assume a positive correlation between age and income.
Then of course, since age is observable, in what follows one has to make the unpleasant (but
not unrealistic) additional assumption that the monopolist is not allowed to discriminate
directly by age.
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Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
de˜(y(pt))
dpt
< 0.
To summarize the results so far, an increase in the ticket price pt does not
only decrease the quantity t of demand in the t-market but also its quality,
namely the average emotionality e˜.
Firms’ demand
We assume that the firms’ demand for sponsorship contracts x with the
monopolist in the x-market does not only depend on the price px for such
contracts but also on the expected emotionality e˜ in the t-market. The latter
may be the case because high emotions during the event might enhance the
effect of advertisement for contracting firms and therefore boost the demand
for their products increasing their profits. More specifically, we make the
following
Assumption 3 For all px ≥ 0 and e˜ ∈ [e, e¯], assume
∂x(px,e˜)
∂px
< 0 and
∂x(px,e˜)
∂e˜
> 0.
Monopolistic profit maximization
The multi-product monopolist simultaneously maximizes his profit pi from
sales in the t-market and the x-market by setting the respective prices pt
and px observing the respective demands t(pt) and x(px, e˜(y(pt))). However,
supplying tickets the monopolist faces a technological constraint t ≤ t¯, which
may be interpreted as the maximum venue capacity, e.g. the number of seats
within a stadium. The maximum ticket price that leads to demand at ca-
pacity t¯,
pˆt := max{pt|t(pt) > t¯},
will be referred to as the maximum sellout price. Note that by Lemma 1, pˆt
is the unique price fulfilling t(pˆt) = t¯. Whenever ticket demand t(pt) exceeds
the capacity t¯, i.e. whenever pt < pˆt, the monopolist uses a fair random
procedure to ration demand.4
For analytical convenience, assume that the monopolist’s production costs
can be described by an additively separable function C(t, x) = Ct(t)+Cx(x).
Hence, the profit function takes the following form:
pi(pt, px) =


ptt¯+ pxx(px, e˜)− Ct(t¯)− Cx(x(px, e˜)), pt ≤ pˆt
ptt(pt) + pxx(px, e˜)− Ct(t(pt))− Cx(x(px, e˜)), pt > pˆt
(4)
4The random procedure is fair in the sense that any individual demanding a ticket is
chosen with the same probability. The existence of superior discrimination mechanisms is
discussed in Section 5.
7
3 The Results
We now formally describe a scenario for the following observation: If demand
quality in the t-market is an important determinant for demand in the x-
market, it may well be optimal to set pt below the maximum sellout price.
To see this, consider a situation in which the monopolist optimally chooses
the price pˆx in the x-market given that he charges the maximum sellout price
pˆt and sells tickets at capacity t¯. In such a case, the partial derivatives of the
profit function are given by
∂pˆi
∂pt
= t¯+
(
pˆx −
dCˆx
dx
)
∂xˆ
∂e˜
deˆ
dpt
, (5)
∂pˆi
∂px
= xˆ+
(
pˆx −
dCˆx
dx
)
∂xˆ
∂px
, (6)
where pˆi := pi(pˆt, pˆx), xˆ := x(pˆx, eˆ), eˆ := e˜(y(pˆt)), and Cˆx := Cx(xˆ).
Using equation (6) and Assumption 3, optimality of pˆx implies that
pˆx −
dCˆx
dx
= − xˆ
∂xˆ/∂px
> 0. Hence, by Lemma 2 and Assumption 3, the second
term in the sum on the right hand side of equation (5) is negative. If this
negative effect is strong enough, ∂pˆi
∂pt
< 0, i.e. marginal profit is negative, indi-
cating additional profits if the price pt is reduced below its maximum sellout
level pˆt. Those considerations prove
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 – 3, the optimal price p∗t in the t-
market lies below the maximum sellout price pˆt, if and only if the average
quality e˜ of customers in the t-market is sufficiently important for the demand
in the x-market; more formally:
p∗t < pˆt ⇔ t¯ < −
(
pˆx −
dCˆx
dx
)
∂xˆ
∂e˜
deˆ
dpt
.
Proposition 1 asserts, that it is optimal to set pt below the maximum sellout
price, whenever the marginal decrease in profit in the t-market from the lower
price is lower than the marginal increase in profit in the x-market from the
augmentation in demand quality in the t-market. The following Corollary
clarifies how prices are actually chosen in this case.
Corollary 1 If p∗t < pˆt, the optimal monopolistic price levels p
∗
t , p
∗
x are given
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by the following conditions:
p∗t = 0 or
∂pi∗
∂pt
= t¯+
(
p∗x −
dC∗x
dx
)
∂x∗
∂e˜
de˜∗
dpt
= 0, (7)
∂pi∗
∂px
= x∗ +
(
p∗x −
dC∗x
dx
)
∂x∗
∂px
= 0, (8)
where pi∗ := pi(p∗t , p
∗
x), x
∗ := x(p∗x, e˜
∗), e˜∗ := e˜(y(p∗t )), and C
∗
x := Cx(x
∗).
So far, the analysis has been conducted as if the resale of tickets were
impossible or, at least, unlikely to occur. Note that in a situation where ticket
demand is randomly rationed, resale deteriorates the customer quality since
only individuals with high valuations (and low quality) want to buy the good
in the black market. Consequently, the expected emotionality and thereby
the demand for sponsorship contracts decrease. Hence, the monopolist has
an incentive to credibly and effectively deter customers from resale because
otherwise his profits diminish. Ex ante, i.e. at the time the monopolist decides
about the prices and before trade has taken place, the difference between the
optimal profit pi∗ and the profit pˆi charging the maximum sellout price serves
as an upper bound for the amount the monopolist is willing to spend for
appropriate measures of deterrence.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 – 3 hold and resale of tickets is
likely to occur. Then the optimal price p∗t in the t-market lies below the
maximum sellout price pˆt, if and only if the average quality e˜ of customers
in the t-market is sufficiently important for the demand in the x-market,
i.e. t¯ < −
(
pˆx −
dCˆx
dx
)
∂xˆ
∂e˜
deˆ
dpt
, and the profit differential pi∗ − pˆi suffices to
finance credible and effective resale deterrence.
4 A simple example
To illustrate the main idea of our model, consider the following example.
There are only two individuals within the economy: Lady Rich has a high
income y¯ and hence a high willingness to pay for a ticket v¯ but a low willing-
ness to show emotions e. Mr. Happy, on the other hand, has a low income
y and hence a low willingness to pay for a ticket v but a high willingness to
show emotions e¯.
The monopolist has zero production costs but is constrained by a stadium
capacity of one single seat (t¯ = 1). Hence, the maximum sell-out price on the
t-market is given by Lady Riche’s willingness to pay: pˆt = v¯. If the monopo-
list charges this price, demand quality equals Lady Riche’s low willingness to
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Figure 1: Average consumer quality.
show emotions: e˜(v¯) = e. If, however, he alternatively charges a ticket price
amounting to Mr. Happy’s willingness to pay, p∗t = v, and randomly rations
demand, expected demand quality equals the equally weighted sum of both
emotionalities e˜(v) = e+e¯
2
. Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the price
and the (average) quality of the customers.
Then, though the monopolist looses revenue in the first market, this loss
might be well offset by higher revenues in a second market x, if quality is
an important determinant of demand in that x-market. Consequently, he
chooses the price p∗t = v below the maximum sellout price pˆt = v¯ if and only
if
v¯ + p¯x · x (p¯x, e) < v + px · x
(
p
x
,
e+ e¯
2
)
, (9)
where p¯x is the optimal price given pt = v¯ and px is the optimal price given
pt = v. Moreover, the difference between both sides of inequality (9) serves
(ex-ante) as an upper bound for the effort the monopolist is willing to spend
in order to deter Mr. Happy from resale.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the price structure a multi-product monopolist chooses
is not only affected by quantity effects across markets but also by quality
effects. In our framework, a higher quality of the customer base in one
market exerts a positive production externality and leads to higher sales
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in an otherwise unrelated market. We have applied the model to explain
underpricing of admission tickets in the entertainment industry. Moreover,
the model is able to elucidate the effort a monopolist might undertake in
order to deter customers in the first market from resale.
While underpricing and rationing of tickets is frequently observed within
the entertainment industry,5 resale deterrence by the organizer itself – like in
the case of the FIFA World Cup – is a new phenomenon.6 This may reflect
the fact that legal provisions or transaction costs that in former hampered
resale anyway, recently can be easily circumvented by the anonymity and
accessability of the internet. Unlike before, nowadays it is the underpricing
monopolist himself who has to take action against resale in order to assure
the intended demand quality.
The character of our analysis is positive; in particular it takes as given
that the monopolist uses a random procedure to ration demand. From a
theoretic point of view there certainly are superior screening mechanisms in
order to discriminate agents with respect to the unobservable characteristic.
In the example discussed, one could think of (personalized) queuing, i.e. mak-
ing use of different opportunity costs, or (beauty) contests. However, under
the assumptions made in the model, underpricing of tickets is necessary to in-
crease demand quality in that market even if, afterwards, the resulting excess
demand is rationed more effectively than by random choice. Consequently,
our qualitative results do not hinge on the assumption of random rationing.
From the viewpoint of Public Economics it is interesting to consider the
welfare implications of the pricing strategy discussed above. Note that we
focus on the case where the monopolist sells at capacity in the t-market.
Consequently, unlike in the x-market, in the t-market there is no inefficiency
arising out of a quantity that is too low. Nevertheless, an inefficiency arises
in the t-market if the monopolist sells to individuals with valuations lower
than the maximum sellout price.7 Hence, from a (utilitarian) welfare per-
5Indeed, even in the case of binding capacity constraints, ticket prices of 0 often can
be found if media platforms (like newspapers, radio- or TV-stations) organize a music or
sports event which is sponsored by firms using the event for promotional activities.
6On 06/03/2006 Kalamazoo, a British security print enterprize, reports in the
rubric Latest News on its web-page that it ‘currently prints personalised sea-
son tickets for a number of premiership football clubs, which when checked
against official forms of ID such as passports and driving licences successfully
controls touting’ (http://www.kalamazoosecure.co.uk/index.asp?locID=38&docID=156).
On 10/11/2006 Ko¨lnTicket, a German ticket agency, reports in the rubric Ak-
tuelles on its web-page the introduction of personalized tickets for concerts as well
(http://www.koelnticket.de/index.php?ref mandantid=1&mapid=aktuelles).
7This is the reason why a black market emerges and resources are spent to foreclose
it. Note that the underpricing strategy will never lead to a Pareto improvement, since it
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spective, the relevant question is whether this inefficiency in the t-market
is offset by the efficiency gain in the x-market, which is due to the positive
externality of higher emotions in the case of underpricing. Unfortunately,
even in our simple partial equilibrium framework, this question cannot be
answered unambiguously without further assumptions.8 To see why, con-
sider the case where the monopolist optimally sets a ticket price below the
maximum sellout price. He does so if pi∗ > pˆi, i.e. if the revenue loss from
underpricing in the t-market is overcompensated by the additional profit in
the x-market. However, he does neither take into account the resulting de-
crease in consumer surplus in the t-market nor the increase of firms’ profits
in the x-market. If the former is big while the latter is small, total benefit
might shrink despite the monopolist’s increasing gain.
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